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Abstract
This paper examines school structure, spending, and performance relationships in California and ﬁnds considerable
support for the public exchange model that predicts that greater competition improves student performance. The evi
dence indicates that, despite claims to the contrary by many advocates of public education, higher education spending
does not raise student achievement. Education spending is also shown to be highest in those counties exhibiting highest
monopoly power as measured by the Herﬁndahl index. Strong support is also shown for the public exchange view that
higher market power leads to lower student achievement in the fourth and eighth grades, but little support is shown
for the tenth grade.

1. Introduction
A common perception is that US public schools perform poorly and that conditions are worsening over time.
Until recently, the predominant view toward reversing
the perceived performance decline was to raise overall
spending, enabling expansion of staff and salaries, capital improvements, professional staff development, school
construction and maintenance, and adoption of new technologies such as computers. An alternative viewpoint
argues that problems are primarily a product of the monopoly position of the public school system.1 US public
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Other viewpoints emphasize school choice vouchers and
charter schools. Those who believe that the public school system is a monopoly protected from competition — both by priv
ate schools and by neighboring public schools — often advocate
school vouchers. Charter schools are outside the control of local
school boards and may ignore state education codes, as well as
develop their own curricula.

schools provide 90% of primary and secondary edu
cation in a public market that has experienced a dramatic
reduction in numbers of school districts — from 108,579
to 14,556 over 1942–1992.2 This paper examines how
the structure of the public school system inﬂuences both
education spending and student performance. A model
of public exchange provides the framework for hypothesizing how voters and education policy makers
exchange with one another within school districts. The
relation between school district structure and spending is
shown to be an empirical matter because a high concen
tration of school districts may lower spending if scale
economies are experienced, but as concentration rises,
spending may rise as well as policy makers exploit
enhanced monopoly powers. This paper also examines
whether higher spending remedies performance prob
lems.
School structure, spending and performance relation-
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Data on number of school districts obtained from various
issues of Census of Governments, US Bureau of the Census.

ships in California are examined. California is a state
that appears to mirror national trends, but at the same
time is at the forefront of national concern.3 The Califor
nia public school system (primary and secondary) is the
nation’s largest with 1002 school districts, employing
over 410,000 workers servicing over 5.3 million pupils
with funding of $32 billion in 1996–97. California has
also experienced a dramatic rise in student population —
over 1.2 million since 1983–84, which represents more
students than currently served by 42 other states. Pre
vious studies often rely on cross-state examination, but
this approach ignores differences in budgetary insti
tutions across states. For example, California’s Prop
osition 98 of 1988 guarantees minimum levels of state
support for all schools and is an important determinant
of school spending levels. Because each state has its own
budgetary institutions and mandates, cross-state examin
ation may incorrectly conclude that variation in spending
or performance is caused by various factors (e.g., differ
ences in school structure, demographics or income) when
that variation results from differences in budgetary insti
tutions. This paper avoids this problem by testing
hypotheses only on data from California.4

2. Public education markets
2.1. Model of public exchange
External beneﬁts may explain why many citizens
advocate a strong governmental presence in elementary
and secondary education.5 External beneﬁts arise when
there are third-party beneﬁciaries, such as the community
and state, when education is produced and consumed.
Because private suppliers cater only to demands of pri
mary beneﬁciaries, a market failure arises whereby the
private market under-provides education in the sense that
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The following statistics are provided by the California
Department of Education and the California Legislative Ana
lysts’ Ofﬁce.
4
Focus on a single state is also consistent with the argument
of Hanushek, Rivkin and Taylor (1996) that empirical studies
should focus on comparing all schools within a school district,
or all school districts within one state. They ﬁnd that the biases
introduced by aggregation to state-level data inﬂate the effects
of school resources on performance. While the present study
examines data on counties, this may not be subject to much
aggregation bias because counties are the location of school
boards in California. Moreover, school ﬁnance is mostly cen
tralized at the state capital, thus removing much of the funding
factors that might arise when counties or school districts are
given greater autonomy to self-ﬁnance their own programs.
5
Lott (1987) offers an alternative view that public schooling
provides the means to indoctrinate students to views that policy
makers believe they should believe.

marginal social beneﬁts outweigh marginal social costs.
Of course, while public provision may remedy the mar
ket failure, public market provision may also over-pro
vide in the sense that marginal social costs outweigh
marginal social beneﬁts.6 A symptom of over-provision
is over-funding of public education.
The ﬁnancing of public education explains why public
schools dominate the supply of education. Public edu
cation is funded through all taxpayers, and individual tax
bills are unrelated to whether taxpayers have children
attending public schools and to the numbers of schoolage children. This is simply a consequence of the abilityto-pay principle of taxation whereby tax bills are not
assigned on the basis of beneﬁts received from policies.
Presence of third-party beneﬁciaries may also partly
explain why all taxpayers share ﬁnancing burdens. In any
event, primary recipients of public education are essen
tially charged zero unit prices under this tax method. In
contrast, private education is funded according to the
beneﬁts principle of ﬁnance whereby unit prices reﬂect
non-zero marginal (private) costs of education provision.
Private education therefore carries a unit price that far
exceeds the zero unit price of public education and, as
a result, public education dominates the education mar
ket, thus leaving the private market relatively small and
perhaps not a particularly strong competitor to public
education. Public education therefore dominates the total
(private and public) market, with relatively little compe
tition from the private market.7 Until school vouchers or
other policies signiﬁcantly break the price advantage, the
public market will most likely continue to dominate the
education market.
A public exchange model has voters and policy mak
ers exchanging with one another within a public edu
cation market that is segmented into school districts.
Voters and parents signal preferences to policy makers
in ways that include dealing directly with teachers, prin
cipals, school boards, and PTAs, as well as voting for
politicians with compatible views.8 Exit options, or “vot
ing-with-your-feet” as developed in Tiebout (1956), are
last resorts when, for instance, dissatisﬁed parents move
from one school district to another as they search for
desired education policies. A system of competing
school districts provides parents with choices that create
incentives for policy makers to be responsive to parental
preferences for quality education.
6

See, for example, Sonstelie (1982).
An expanding literature on private schools is evolving; see
West and Palsson (1988), Hamilton and Macauley (1991), Mar
tinez-Vazquez and Seaman (1985), Couch, Shughart and Willi
ams (1993), and Newmark (1995).
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These options are discussed in Hirschman (1970). For a
more detailed examination of the roles of voice and exit see
Marlow (1992). This paper’s public exchange model in edu
cation follows the framework developed in Marlow (1997).
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Evidence supports the notion that communities are
concerned about the quality of their public schools.
Black (1997) uses housing prices to infer the value par
ents place on school quality, where school quality is pro
xied by elementary school test scores. She infers values
by looking within school districts along only one dimen
sion: the elementary school the child attends. After con
trolling for school ﬁnancial inputs and neighborhoods,
higher test scores are found to be associated with higher
housing prices; a 5% increase in test scores leads to 2.1%
rise in house prices. Black (1997) concludes that this
relationship demonstrates that parents are sensitive to
apparently small differences in school performance, as
measured by housing prices. Of course, all homeowners,
with or without school-age children, will tend to be con
cerned as well because of the connection between the
quality of local schools and housing prices.
There is also evidence that supports the notion that
not all parents, or communities, prefer the same type of
public school system. Areas that have greater variation
in economic characteristics, or preferences, of residents
are shown to have greater numbers of school districts
than those with less variation. Fisher and Wassmer
(1998) examined school districts in the 167 largest
metropolitan areas in 1982 and ﬁnd that there are more
smaller local districts when the differences among citi
zens with regard to desired government services
expands. That is, in order for there to be relatively few
school districts, citizens must display relatively little
diversity in preferences for the mix of government ser
vices provided. This view is reinforced in Martinez-Vaz
quez, Rider and Walker (1997) who ﬁnd that income,
age, and racial variation in communities play a role in
determining numbers of school districts. These studies
suggest that greater variation of preferences among resi
dents leads to greater choices in public education pro
viders. Greater variety in choices will be reﬂected in
policies as well as sizes of schools and districts.
School district options, or choices, play a pivotal role
in establishing the degree of leverage that parents exer
cise over school teachers, administrators and staff. Flee
ing to competing districts jeopardizes funding bases of
school districts that lose students and is akin to private
suppliers losing customers to competitors that offer bet
ter products or lower prices. Ease of ﬂeeing is related to
proximity of competitors as well as number of alternative
suppliers. With relatively few competitors, the Leviathan
view of Brennan and Buchanan (1980) predicts that pol
icy makers will pursue budgets and behaviors reﬂecting
their narrow interests, as opposed to those of parents and
taxpayers. The range of interested policy makers
includes teachers, union ofﬁcials, and school staff.
Higher spending associated with lack of competition
may therefore reﬂect higher salaries, shorter working
hours, more teaching assistants, more paid holidays, and
other forms of compensation that may not be directly

related to student performance. This view is consistent
with Niskanen’s (1971) theory of bureaucracy whereby
government policy makers maximize functions other
than proﬁts, such as non-pecuniary income — obviously
an issue for public education since policy makers do not
operate under a proﬁt-maximization constraint.9
There is some evidence that indicates that public edu
cation spending may not always be directed toward
improving student performance. Duplantis, Chandler and
Geske (1995) ﬁnd that unionization and collective bar
gaining are reasons behind cost escalation in public edu
cation. Kurth (1987) ﬁnds that the presence of teachers’
unions exerts negative inﬂuences on test scores. Hoxby
(1996) concludes that teachers’ unions increase school
inputs (e.g., teacher salaries, per-student expenditures,
and teacher–student ratios), but reduce productivity suf
ﬁciently to raise drop-out rates. Unionization may there
fore partially explain why public schools can simul
taneously cost more and perform more poorly over time.
However, unionization effects are probably not
important in the present study since California is a heav
ily unionized state and therefore little inter-county vari
ation in unionization should exist. It should also be noted
that Eberts and Stone (1984) ﬁnd that union schools are
more productive (based on pre- and post-test scores) than
non-union schools for the average elementary student.
Therefore the evidence is mixed on the effect of unioniz
ation on school performance.
Within the public education market of California there
appears to be untapped potential for extensive compe
tition between and within school districts. There are over
7700 public schools within over 1000 school districts
and 57 counties. However, in most cases, parents have
very limited choices about which school they may send
their children to since they are assigned a particular
school within their district.10 “Exclusive territories” cre
ate monopolies within districts whereby parents must
move to other neighborhoods if they wish to send their
children to better schools, even though moves may only
be a block or so from present locations. This arrange
ment restricts exit options, thus reinforcing monopolistic
power stemming from how ﬁnancing systems crowd-out
private schools. The public exchange model predicts that
Leviathan policy makers take advantage of monopoly
power, as revealed by over-expanded budgets and rela
tively low student performance. This model also predicts
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On the bureaucracy issue in public education, Anderson,
Shughart and Tollison (1991) ﬁnd that states with relatively
large numbers of administrative personnel also have lower stud
ent achievement on standardized tests and higher drop-out rates.
However, Brewer (1996) ﬁnds that the number of administrators
does not exert negative impacts on student achievement in New
York schools.
10
West (1990) discusses this issue.

that greater public funding will not necessarily improve
performance since it is likely that spending hikes will be
diverted away from uses that are most closely connected
to student performance.
2.2. Counterviews: scale economies and shared
taxation
A competing view is that quality improvement simply
requires higher funding and an emphasis on greater com
petition may raise spending as smaller public
schools/districts are less able to exploit scale economies.
However, while economies of scale may arise in edu
cation, past consolidation of districts does not appear to
have been prompted by attempts to lower costs. Kenny
and Schmidt (1994) argue that attempts to exploit scale
economies are one of three factors that explain school
district consolidation over 1950–1980. The other two
factors are state aid growth, which lowered quality dif
ferences between districts, and growing powers of teach
ers’ unions using consolidation to lower costs of organiz
ing memberships.
Another counterview is Rivlin’s (1992) argument that
inter-governmental competition mostly leads to ﬁghts
over which jurisdictions can lower tax burdens the quick
est. Competition has two defects according to this view:
it results in tax revenues that do not meet the needs of
governments (i.e., under-taxation) and it reinforces the
fact that jurisdictions have unequal resources.11 Rivlin
(1992) proposes “uniform shared taxes” as a correction
whereby (state) governments pool tax revenues and then
return them with some emphasis on redistributing rev
enues from richer to poorer states. Shared taxation
removes taxpayer incentives to ﬂee governments on the
basis of “high” tax policies because local governments
have little control over tax policies when all governments
share taxes set at uniform rates. Because this framework
assumes that governments will then only compete on the
basis of beneﬁts provided rather than taxes levied, social
welfare is predicted to rise. This view also assumes that
benevolent, as opposed to Leviathan, policy makers do
not exploit enhanced monopoly powers that arise from
shared taxation, but simply focus on providing higherquality programs through enhanced revenue-raising abili
ties.
How a system of shared uniform taxation would
inﬂuence behavior is clear under the public exchange
model. Shared taxation protects and increases monopoly
positions of governments since it prevents governments
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While Rivlin (1992) makes the case against inter-govern
mental competition between state governments, the general case
appears to be about governmental competition and therefore
could be applied to competition between school districts as
well.

from competing on the basis of tax policies, thus effec
tively creating one large monopoly government from
which taxpayers/citizens may not easily escape. Selfinterested policy makers then operate under enhanced
monopoly positions that contribute to lower-quality,
more costly programs. The public exchange model there
fore predicts that shared taxation contributes to perform
ance that falls below what would arise under a system
of many governments, or private schools, each of which
competes for tax revenues, private tuition revenues and
students.
2.3. California’s system of shared taxation
Much of school ﬁnance in California is a product of
shared taxation.12 While 25 years ago local school dis
tricts were mostly funded by locally derived revenues,
funding decisions are now dominated by budgetary
decisions made in the state capital of Sacramento. These
decisions are inﬂuenced by Propositions 13 and 98, with
the latter passed in 1988 and mandating minimum fund
ing guarantees for kindergarten through community col
leges. Proposition 98 constraints now account for
roughly 80% of total funding. Perhaps the most
important budgetary constraint is that imposed by the
Serrano vs. Priest ruling of 1972 in which the Supreme
Court of California required restructuring of the school
ﬁnance system to virtually eliminate spending differ
ences between school districts on the basis of wealth.
The California legislature then imposed revenue limits
on districts and provided $2.4 billion in additional fund
ing for poorer school districts. In effect, court rulings
mandated that school ﬁnance be tied to a system of
shared taxation whereby the state government was
responsible for collecting taxes from local governments
and then returning revenues to school districts on the
basis of various factors such as numbers of students and
redistribution to poorer districts. This system therefore
limits the abilities of local school ofﬁcials to make fund
ing decisions and constrains inter-district competition by
limiting the ability of school districts to demonstrate that
they use local funds wisely, since funding comes from
a common base in Sacramento. This funding arrange
ment may lead to a commons problem whereby lack of
property rights to tax dollars leads to over-use of the
revenue base since providers of tax dollars are not neces
sarily the ones primarily beneﬁting from use of those
tax dollars.13
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See California Legislative Analyst’s Ofﬁce (1995) for a
discussion of school ﬁnance.
13
Wagner (1992) refers to a ﬁscal process where choice is
divorced from liability, taxes or public debt, as one of “ﬁscal
irresponsibility” and creates a “commons” institutional setting
that promotes over-spending.

Of course, many school districts — especially wealthy
ones — did not particularly like shared taxation whereby
portions of local tax revenues ﬂowed to other school dis
tricts. Fischel (1988) argues that Proposition 13 was
caused by Serrano since it allowed high-property-value
school districts/counties to bypass some of the redistri
bution (from high- to low-property-value counties)
required by Serrano. Proposition 13 capped property tax
rates and growth in assessed value, reducing by 54% the
amount of property taxes available to fund services pro
vided by cities, counties, school districts, and other
government agencies. Silva and Sonstelie (1995) ﬁnd
that Serrano created some equalization across school dis
tricts, but also is partially responsible for some of the
decline in average funding per student across California.
In a comprehensive study of school ﬁnance in 1992–93,
the US General Accounting Ofﬁce (1997) ﬁnds that,
while most states attempt to equalize funding across
school districts, wealthier districts in 37 states had more
total funding than poor districts, after controlling for dif
ferences in geographic and student-needs-related costs
such as special education. The imbalance averaged 24%
on a per pupil basis across states, with California needing
to shift 35% more state funds from wealthy to poor or
middle-class districts in order to meet equalization cri
teria. The imbalance appears to be a result of wealthier
districts supplementing their shared tax revenue with
fees and parental contributions as well as political forces
in the redistribution process in Sacramento.

3. Hypotheses
The public exchange model predicts that price advan
tages that public schools enjoy over private schools and
exclusive territory constraints within school districts dis
courage competition. Although Serrano has not brought
perfect equality of funding in California, it created a sys
tem of shared taxation that supports a monopolistic pub
lic school market. Public education is therefore predicted
to exhibit behaviors consistent with the model of public
exchange within a setting of monopoly; i.e., school dis
tricts with few or no competitors should be out-perfor
med by districts with more competitors.
Another hypothesis is that spending and performance
are not necessarily directly related. One reason for ambi
guity is that, since local government control over
ﬁnances is imperfect under shared taxation, policy mak
ers and local taxpayers have little incentive to be costconscious in a setting where funding dollars come from
a communal and statewide funding pool. Coupled with
Niskanen’s (1971) theory of bureaucracy whereby mon
opoly governments maximize functions other than pro
ﬁts, higher funding is not necessarily a sign of higherquality education. Downes (1996) ﬁnds evidence that
California school districts had monopoly power before

and after Proposition 13, although somewhat less after
Proposition 13. Evidence of monopoly behavior was that
administrators substituted improved student performance
for greater numbers of administrative staff.
Local taxpayers may also believe that, at the margin,
higher local spending may be funded from taxpayers of
other areas since all school districts compete against one
another for communal statewide funds. Under shared
taxation there may be less resistance at the local level to
oppose spending increases since local funding levels are
now less related to local tax burdens. Within this setting,
taxpayers may not be particularly vigilant in their efforts
to control excessive spending, and possibly may lobby
for spending growth on the assumption that their tax bills
will rise less than local gains in spending. Moreover, a
Niskanen (1971) asymmetric information problem may
exist whereby state ofﬁcials, or local taxpayers/parents
in our application, experience high monitoring costs and
lack of private market counterparts with which to assess
arguments that school district ofﬁcials make for higher
funding. Such a setting suggests that higher spending
will not necessarily indicate higher-quality education and
further contributes to ambiguity about the spending–per
formance relationship. Higher spending may simply
reﬂect higher monopoly power and therefore may be
associated with either higher or lower performance. The
spending–performance relationship is therefore ambigu
ous and we cannot rule out that higher spending is sim
ply a function of greater monopoly power, or even that
an inverse relation between spending and performance
arises when spending is relatively high, and performance
relatively poor, as a result of monopoly power.

4. Testing methodology
4.1. Performance measures
Appropriate measurement of school performance is
obviously important as parents need good information by
which to base schooling choices and policy makers need
to somehow determine which schools perform well and
which perform poorly. While spending used to be the
most commonly used barometer of performance, the
empirical evidence makes clear that education spending,
by itself, is a poor gage of how well schools educate
students. Hanushek’s (1986) survey of 65 studies con
cludes that little connection between inputs and output
exists and even the few studies that ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
effect from spending also ﬁnd that effects are mostly
trivial in magnitude.
Several studies have measured effects of schools on
students through subsequent earnings of those students.
This approach assumes that the effect of a school on a
student is ideally one that lasts a lifetime. However, evi
dence provided by Betts (1995, 1996) and Grogger

(1996) indicates little effect of school resources, such as
spending and class size, on subsequent earnings. Unfor
tunately, this evidence suggests that performance of pub
lic schools may be worse than previously thought since
students do not appear to gain the ability to earn higher
incomes later in life when we raise school spending or
other inputs today — thus suggesting that resources are
not used wisely. The evidence, however, is mixed on this
issue, as Card and Krueger (1992, 1996) argue that
higher spending raises labor market outcomes of stu
dents.
Perhaps the growing interest in class-size reduction is
a result of growing awareness by the public and policy
makers that higher spending, by itself, is not the way to
solve the problems of public education. Hanushek (1998)
notes that proposals for class-size reductions are a rally
ing point for parents, teachers, and administrators across
the nation, and politicians have rushed to claim credit
for introducing policies aimed at reducing class sizes.
The pupil–teacher ratio, for example, is frequently
becoming the fundamental metric for quality which has
begun replacing spending per student as the common
measure of adequacy and equity. There is little evidence,
however, that class size exerts any systematic effect on
student performance, although it certainly is related to
overall costs. While it appears to be commonsense that
lower class sizes should be associated with higher stud
ent performance, Hanushek (1998) concludes that the
empirical evidence does not strongly support this belief.
The evidence on class size is, however, mixed. Eberts
and Stone (1984) ﬁnd that class size is an important fac
tor explaining school performance. It is also possible that
research that ﬁnds no relation between class size and per
formance is based on class sizes that are larger than what
educators believe can make a signiﬁcant difference.
Glass and Smith (1978), for instance, show that
reductions in classes that contain below 21 students exert
signiﬁcant effects, but little effect occurs in larger
classes. Perhaps this explains why class sizes of 20 and
below are often the goal of policies seeking to lower
class size in elementary schools. This view also suggests
that previous research showing no relation between class
size and student performance is a result of class sizes
being too large to demonstrate beneﬁts of class-size
reduction.
The teacher–student ratio is examined here because
parents commonly view class size as an important per
formance gage. It is an easily observed measure and it
is also likely that responsive administrators will respond
to apparently strong parental preferences for small
classrooms. The hypothesized relationship is ambiguous
between teacher–student ratios and the degree of compe
tition in the public education market. More competitive
markets may tend to have more teachers per student, as
school policy makers are hypothesized to be more
responsive to parental preferences for smaller class sizes

when they operate under more competitive conditions
than when they operate in less competitive markets. It is
also likely that if administrators and staff prefer to
receive income in the form of salary and beneﬁts rather
than in smaller class sizes, they may also prefer larger
class sizes as the hiring of additional teachers means
fewer dollars for themselves. If true, this also means that
less competitive markets allow this preference to be
more fully exploited, thus suggesting that, as markets
become more monopolistic, class sizes rise as measured
by falling teacher–student ratios. However, even though
administrators and staff may prefer larger class sizes so
as to receive higher salaries, they may be constrained in
their efforts to divert income to themselves in this man
ner. Salaries, for instance, are highly observable and
therefore may receive greater public scrutiny than other
forms of compensation such as beneﬁts, class sizes, and
paid holidays. The relationship between teacher–student
ratios and monopoly power is therefore an empirical
question.
In 1993, the average teacher–student ratio at the
county level was 0.048.14 The average classroom was
therefore composed of 20 students per teacher. The range
for the teacher–student ratio was 0.083 to 0.04, and the
median value was 0.046.
Test scores on standardized tests are also examined.
While test scores on standardized tests have been fre
quently used to measure student achievement, Summers
and Wolfe (1977) argue that the distribution of test
scores should somehow be accounted for in order to
appropriately gage performance. This argument is based
on the observation that students in the tails of the distri
bution typically receive the marginal dollar of school
expenditures, either through special services or classes
for disadvantaged, special or gifted students.
The CLAS Grade Level Performance Assessments
were administered to fourth, eighth, and tenth graders
throughout California during school year 1993–94 and
covered reading, writing, and mathematics. There are six
performance levels, 1 through 6, with performance level
6 being the highest. Table 1 displays the percentage of
students achieving at or above performance level 4 — a
measure used by the California Department of Education
as its common measure of school performance. For grade
4, the following percentages of students achieved at least
level 4: 21.58% (reading), 29.23% (math), and 30.35%
(writing). For grade 8, the following percentages of stu
dents achieved at least level 4: 40.37% (reading), 25.25%
(math), and 47.23% (writing). For grade 10, 32.60%
(reading), 15.09% (math), and 38.82% (writing) of stu
dents achieved at or above level 4. It is hypothesized
that more competitive public education markets will be
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The county average is calculated by taking the average of
school districts.

Table 1
Percentage of students achieving at or above performance level
4: summary statistics

Reading
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
Observations
Math
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
Observations
Writing
Mean
Median
Maximum
Minimum
Standard deviation
Observations

Grade 4

Grade 8

Grade 10

21.58
21.00
35.00
11.00
5.47
58

40.37
41.00
68.00
22.00
8.87
57

32.60
32.00
50.00
17.00
7.70
57

29.23
29.00
52.00
15.00
7.66
57

25.25
26.00
49.00
9.00
8.37
57

15.09
14.00
30.00
6.00
5.51
57

30.35
39.00
56.00
19.00
7.86
57

47.23
48.00
71.00
28.00
8.79
57

38.82
39.00
56.00
19.00
7.86
57

those with higher percentages of students achieving at or
above performance level 4.
4.2. Competition measures
Studies have concluded that greater competition yields
higher student performance. Borland and Howsen (1992)
examine whether public school competition improves
school performance, where the Herﬁndahl index based
on school districts within a county measures competition.
Average scores for reading, language, and math for thirdgrade students within a school district measure school
performance based on 170 school districts in Kentucky
during 1989–1990. Greater competition is found to yield
higher student performance and lower teacher salaries.
Borland and Howsen (1993), in a re-test of Borland and
Howsen (1992), ﬁnd that a Herﬁndahl score of 0.50 is a
critical threshold which, assuming an even distribution
of students across school districts, means that two dis
tricts make a competitive market. Thus, test score gains
from competition do not require many schooling choices.
Blair and Staley (1995) examine whether competition
from neighboring school districts exerts a positive inﬂu
ence on local school performance. They examine 266
school districts in the six largest metropolitan areas of
Ohio and measure performance as a composite index of
mean scores for reading, mathematics, and language arts
among students in the fourth, sixth and eighth grades.
The primary measure of competition is the average test

score in contiguous school districts, based on the hypoth
esis that nearby school districts that perform well exert
beneﬁcial effects on local performance. They ﬁnd that
higher performance of adjacent districts exerts a positive
effect on performance in the subject district, thus indicat
ing that beneﬁcial effects on adjacent districts are pro
vided when a school district becomes more competitive
on the basis of test scores.
Hoxby (1994) examines how expanding public school
choice in metropolitan areas would inﬂuence school per
formance. She expands choice by using exogenous vari
ation in the concentration of school districts measured
by the Herﬁndahl index on enrollment shares. Easier
choice is found to lower per-pupil spending, lower
teacher salaries, and expand class sizes. However, the
same areas also exhibit higher average student perform
ance, thus indicating that greater competition fosters
higher-quality education.
Marlow (1997) examines whether competition meas
ured by numbers of school districts and schools exerts
beneﬁcial effects on student performance. This crossstate study measures performance by average SAT
scores, eighth-grade mathematics proﬁciency, and high
school drop-out rates over 1988–1990. Greater compe
tition through greater numbers of school districts is
found to raise public education spending, but greater
competition also is found to promote higher student
achievement.
Zanzig (1997) examines whether greater competition
among school districts improves public school perform
ance using 1970 data on 337 school districts in Califor
nia. Student achievement is measured by test scores of
high-school seniors (arithmetic portion of the Iowa Tests
of Educational Development). Two alternative measures
of competition are examined: the Herﬁndahl index and
number of school districts per county. Greater compe
tition is found to improve student achievement, and it
takes between three and ﬁve school districts to make a
completely competitive education market. That is, test
scores rise with numbers of school districts, with a point
of saturation reached between three and four districts —
a minimum of three districts is necessary to reach the
competitive threshold. Thus, Zanzig (1997) concludes
that counties that have one or two school districts should
consider restructuring their school system into three or
more districts if they are interested in improving stud
ent achievement.
The present study measures public school market
competition by the Herﬁndahl index as this measure
appears to have become the measure of choice in the
literature. California provides a rich data set with its 57
counties and over 1000 school districts. It is appropriate
to use counties as the unit of observation since California
school districts are organized within counties and over
seen by county boards of education, all of which are
elected except for Los Angeles county’s board which is

appointed by its Board of Supervisors. The Herﬁndahl
index is the sum of squared shares in each market and
therefore has a minimum value of near 0 and a maximum
value of 1. Lower values indicate competitive markets
and, at the extreme value of one, a perfect monopoly
since this means that a sole ﬁrm controls the market.
Three Herﬁndahl index measures are calculated —
one for each grade level of performance data. Separate
calculations for each grade level begin by determining
which schools offer the particular grade level.
Enrollment at this grade level for each school district is
then determined, followed by calculation of its share of
total county enrollment. The square of each school dis
trict’s share of total county enrollment at this grade level
is then summed to provide the Herﬁndahl score.
Table 2 displays summary statistics for the three Her
ﬁndahl index calculations. Mean Herﬁndahl scores are
0.32 (fourth grade), 0.32 (eighth grade) and 0.42 (tenth
grade). The higher value for the tenth grade is not sur
prising since there tend to be many more elementary
schools than there are high schools, thus fostering more
schooling choices at lower-grade levels than at the
higher-grade levels. The Herﬁndahl scores indicate that
lower-grade levels therefore provide more competitive
environments than do higher-grade levels.

5. Spending and performance equations15
The following models of cross-county spending and
performance equations are estimated:
EXPi=f(Yi, DENSITYi, STUDENTi, STATEi,
FEDERALi, BLACKi, HISPANICi, ASIANi, HERFi)
(1)
Table 2
Herﬁndahl scores: summary statistics
Grade 4
Mean
0.32
Median
0.19
Maximum
1.00
Minimum
0.06
Standard deviation 0.29
Observations
58

15

Grade 8

Grade 10

0.31
0.20
1.00
0.06
0.28
58

0.42
0.32
1.00
0.08
0.27
58

An alternative empirical approach is to estimate frontier
production functions that provide information on the level of
efﬁciency that public schools obtain. Cooper and Cohn (1997)
develop this approach and demonstrate how its use on data on
public school classes in South Carolina result in different results
than when the “educational production function” approach (e.g.,
that used in the present paper) is used.

and
PERFi=f(EXPi, Yi, DENSITYi, STATEi, FEDERALi,
BLACKi, HISPANICi, ASIANi, HERFi),
(2)
where
= education spending per pupil at the primary
and secondary levels, in dollars
Yi
= per capita personal income, in dollars
DENSITYi = population divided by square miles
STUDENTi = student share of the population
STATEi = state share of education funding
FEDERALi = federal share of education funding
BLACKi = Black percentage share of student popu
lation
HISPANICi = Hispanic percentage share of student
population
ASIANi = Asian percentage share of student population
HERFi = Herﬁndahl index score
PERFi = reading, writing, and math achievement, and
teacher–student ratios
EXPi

Eq. (1) regresses education spending per pupil on the
following factors. Per capita personal income is expected
to exert a positive inﬂuence on spending when it reﬂects
the county’s demand for education funding. Population
density is expected to exert a positive inﬂuence on
spending since it is often argued that more urban areas
have higher costs than more rural areas. Duncombe and
Yinger (1997), for example, argue that inner-city schools
costs more, but they also are more inefﬁcient when given
additional state aid than schools not located in the inner
city. The student share of the population would exert a
positive inﬂuence on spending when it inﬂuences the
strength of the demand for education spending by par
ents. On the other hand, an increase in the students’ share
might increase the tax price of education, thus possibly
reducing the demand for education by taxpayers. Two
studies ﬁnd that voter age inﬂuences public spending on
education. Miller (1996) ﬁnds that parents of school-age
children have exerted an increasing positive inﬂuence on
public school spending. Poterba (1997) ﬁnds that an
increase in the fraction of elderly residents in a state is
associated with a signiﬁcant reduction in per-child edu
cational spending on K-12 education.
Shares of funding through state and federal revenues
may exert two opposed effects on spending. One poten
tial effect follows the Brennan and Buchanan (1980)
hypothesis that more centralized funding causes tax
payers to perceive tax burdens to be lower than when all
funding is local. Under this view, greater use of state
and/or federal funding will cause voters to demand more
spending under the ﬁscal illusion that it is cheaper than

local funding and therefore a positive relationship
between state and federal shares of funding and edu
cation spending would follow. The other potential effect
is a product of California’s effort to equalize spending
across school districts. With these efforts, we should
expect that greater funding through state and federal
sources would be targeted to those school districts with
relatively few ﬁnancial resources. Therefore, if this
occurs, then higher shares of state and federal funding
will be related to relatively low levels of spending simply
because these jurisdictions would normally have rela
tively small spending levels as a result of being relatively
poor. Given that equalization efforts have been fought
by richer districts and supplemented by other ﬁnancing
sources, higher shares of state and federal funding would
tend to rise in jurisdictions that tend to spend relatively
less on education. Given these two potential and offset
ting effects on education spending, the net effect remains
an empirical question to be resolved through estimation.
The public exchange view predicts that more concen
trated districts would have higher spending since policy
makers in the more-concentrated districts enjoy greater
monopoly power than those in less-concentrated dis
tricts. The alternative view is that because greater con
centration allows greater scale economies, there will be
a negative relation between Herﬁndahl scores and spend
ing. These two predictions are therefore opposite in
direction and the net effect is an empirical matter.
Eq. (2) regresses performance measures on various
factors. Performance is measured four ways: percentage
of students achieving at or above performance level 4 in
reading, math and writing, and the teacher–student ratio.
Expenditures per pupil are expected to exert a positive
effect on performance according to the conventional
view. But, as discussed previously, bureaucracy theory
suggests that higher spending by itself need not ﬁlter
down to higher performance. The connection between
education spending and program quality is therefore
ambiguous: higher spending could simply reﬂect higher
costs with little connection to higher performance due to
higher monopoly power, or it could also reﬂect higherquality school programs. The net effect remains an
empirical question.
Per capita income is expected to exert a positive
inﬂuence on performance since it is commonly believed
that income and educational achievement are positively
related. That is, the higher are parents’ income, the
higher will be the demand for quality education as meas
ured by higher test achievement or small class sizes.
Population density controls for the effect of urbanization
on performance and it is often believed that greater den
sity leads to lower performance. State and federal shares
of funding control for whether non-local funding inﬂu
ences performance.
Median education is expected to exert a positive
inﬂuence on performance based on the assumption that

the higher is local educational attainment, the greater the
demand for high academic achievement of local children.
The percentages of student populations that are Black,
Hispanic or Asian are additional control variables that
might explain variation in performance. Sander (1992)
ﬁnds that ethnic and religious effects on educational
attainment are partly explained by differentials in par
ental endowments such as parents’ schooling and
father’s occupation.
Herﬁndahl scores are expected to negatively inﬂuence
test achievement under the public exchange model since
higher values reﬂect less competition in the public edu
cation market. A positive relationship is predicted by the
alternative view that greater concentration allows greater
scale economies that then allow more spending dollars
to be diverted to those areas that most beneﬁt students.
For example, scale economies might allow highly con
centrated school districts to offer greater variety of
courses, better facilities or other means of fostering stud
ent achievement. Once again, there are potentially
opposing effects on student achievement from this mon
opoly power variable and actual effects remain empiri
cal issues.
Herﬁndahl scores are expected to negatively affect the
teacher–student ratio under the public exchange model
when parents strongly believe that smaller class sizes are
an important component to school performance. Even if
policy makers do not believe that lowering class size will
raise student achievement, the public exchange model
predicts that they have little choice but to conform to
these parental preferences when they operate in competi
tive education markets. That is, Herﬁndahl scores should
be negatively related to teacher–student ratios. More
over, as discussed previously, if administrators and staff
prefer to receive income in the form of salary and bene
ﬁts rather than in smaller class sizes, they may also pre
fer larger class sizes as the hiring of additional teachers
means fewer dollars for themselves. If true, this also
means that less-competitive markets allow this prefer
ence to be more fully exploited, thus suggesting once
again that, as markets become less competitive as
reﬂected by higher Herﬁndahl scores, teacher–student
ratios should fall. However, it is not clear that public
opinion will allow signiﬁcant hikes in salaries, and there
fore higher compensation may arise in other areas such
as beneﬁts, paid holidays, etc.
An alternative view is that more teachers (per student)
may be hired with cost savings that follow higher scale
economies associated with higher Herﬁndahl scores.
This view assumes that policy makers do not exploit
monopoly powers along the lines of bureaucracy theory
and that policy makers believe that smaller class sizes
are useful outlets for cost savings that arise from scale
economies associated with relatively concentrated edu
cation markets. A positive relationship between Herﬁn
dahl scores and teacher–student ratios is predicted under

these assumptions. The relation between Herﬁndahl
scores and teacher–student ratios is therefore ambiguous.
Data for these variables are available for most counties
during 1993. Two sparsely populated counties did not
participate in many of the data collection efforts of the
California Department of Education, thus providing from
53 to 55 observations out of the 57 counties. Signiﬁcance
of estimated coefﬁcients is based on two-tailed tests at
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels.
The California Department of Education provides raw
data at the level of school districts. These data were then
aggregated to the county level and then compiled into a
master ﬁle with data collected from other sources. Data
at the county level collected from the California Statisti
cal Abstract of 1996 are: per capita income, population,
and median numbers of years of schooling (only avail
able for 1990).
Table 3 displays summary statistics of the data that
have not already been discussed in Table 1 (student
achievement) and Table 2 (Herﬁndahl scores). Education
spending per pupil averages $4188.70, with a range of
$5357.82 to $3529.21. As evidence of the spending
equalization effort, the state share of funding variable
averages 0.57, with a range of 0.80 to 0.18, thus indicat
ing a wide range of state support. The federal share of
funding averages 0.06, and with a range of 0.02 to 0.11
indicates the relatively small role of the federal govern
ment in attempting to equalize school spending through
expending its own dollars. The racial mix of student
populations show high diversity: Black (4.09% average,
with range of 0% to 22.89%), Hispanic (23.58% average,
with range of 1.99% to 78.65%) and Asian (5.04% aver
age, with range of 0% to 38.75%).

6. SUR estimation
6.1. Education spending per pupil and performance
equations
The seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) method
estimates the parameters of the system of spending and
performance equations by accounting for contempor
aneous correlation in the errors across equations. This is
a recursive model that consists of a series of endogenous
variables that are considered as a group because they
appear to bear a close conceptual relationship to one
another. Spending, measures of student performance
(reading, math, and writing), and teacher–student ratios
are often grouped together as indicators of public school
performance by both the public and educators and there
fore the SUR technique appears to be appropriate here.
Relationships between these equations are indicated
when the error terms of these equations are correlated
and, in this case, the SUR model allows for more
efﬁcient estimates than would arise under estimation by
ordinary least squares. As Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991,
p. 310) discuss, SUR estimation is basically a two-stage
estimation procedure that results in consistent and
asymptotically efﬁcient estimates.
Table 4 displays SURs of education spending and
fourth-grade performance equations. In the spending
equation, only the Herﬁndahl score exerts a statistically
signiﬁcant effect — a positive effect, as hypothesized by
the public exchange view that higher monopoly power
leads to higher spending. In the reading achievement
equation, education spending exerts a positive, but
weakly signiﬁcant (0.10 level) effect, thus indicating that
higher spending improves reading achievement. Median

Table 3
Summary statistics of remaining variables
Variable

Mean

Minimum

Maximum

Education spending per student
Per capita income
Population density
Teacher–student ratio
Student share of population
State share of funding
Federal share of funding
Median education
Black student percentage
Hispanic student percentage
Asian student percentage

4188.79
19,267.25
470.75
0.05
0.18
0.57
0.06
13.22
4.09
23.58
5.04

3529.21
12,776
1.81
0.04
0.08
0.18
0.02
12.20
0.00
1.99
0.00

5357.82
38,687
15805.14
0.06
0.25
0.80
0.11
15.40
22.89
78.65
38.75

Standard deviation
297.13
4790.10
1601.28
0.006
0.03
0.15
0.02
0.64
4.95
17.43
6.55

Table 4
SUR estimations of education spending and fourth-grade performance (education spending: per pupil)
Education spending
Constant

3224.96a
4.85

Education spending
Per capita income
Population density
Student share of population
State share of funding
Federal share of funding

0.03
1.56
0.03
0.027
�11.30
0.01
103.66
0.18
4783.16
1.40

% Black
1.59
% Hispanic
0.73
% Asian
0.85
Median education
Herﬁndahl
R2 adjusted
S.e.e.
N
a
b
c

545.92a
2.65
0.07
375.73
54

Reading

Math

Writing

Teacher–
student ratio

�62.52a
3.86
0.002c
1.60
�0.0001
0.74
0.001
1.07

�61.31a
2.86
�0.001
0.84
0.0004c
1.85
0.001
1.45

�73.42a
3.72
0.002
1.41
�0.0003
1.18
0.002
1.20

�0.02
0.70
1.24×10�5a
6.88
�1.9×10�7
0.61
�3.8×10�6a
3.05

0.01
�5.59
1.20
�20.99
0.61
�0.12
1.15
�0.01
0.36
0.01
0.09
6.49a
4.79
�4.13b
2.46
0.72
2.94
54

0.01
5.09
0.94
�30.73
0.74
�0.47a
3.81
�0.13a
3.78
�0.20
1.39
6.97a
4.25
�1.45
0.71
0.80
3.45
53

0.01
�4.58
0.81
�44.09
1.06
�0.10
0.73
�0.03
0.85
�0.04
0.26
8.24a
5.01
�3.38c
1.66
0.71
3.57
54

0.01
�7.4×10�5
0.01
�0.07
1.59
0.73
0.85
0.26
0.002
0.77
0.01c
1.81
0.56
0.01
54

Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test).

education behaves according to expectations since it is
found to exert a strongly positive and signiﬁcant effect
on reading achievement. The Herﬁndahl score is found
to exert a signiﬁcant and negative effect on reading
achievement, thus providing evidence in support of the
public exchange view that less competitive school sys
tems have relatively lower achievement.
In the math achievement equation, signiﬁcant effects
are found for per capita income (positive, as expected),
median education (positive, as expected), and percent
ages of Blacks and Hispanics in the student body
(negative). Only median education (positive, as
expected) and the Herﬁndahl score (negative, as pre
dicted by the public exchange view) are found to exert
signiﬁcant inﬂuences on writing achievement. For the
teacher–student ratio equation, education spending
(positive), population density (negative), and the Her
ﬁndahl score (positive, but weakly signiﬁcant at the 0.10
level) exert signiﬁcant effects.
Table 5 displays SURs of education spending and
eighth-grade performance equations. In the spending

equation, only the Herﬁndahl score exerts a statistically
signiﬁcant effect — the positive effect hypothesized by
the public exchange view. In the reading achievement
equation, education spending exerts a negative and sig
niﬁcant effect. While the Black and Hispanic percentages
of student bodies are found to be negatively related to
achievement, the Asian percentage exerts no signiﬁcant
effect. Median education exerts the hypothesized posi
tive and signiﬁcant effect on reading achievement. The
Herﬁndahl score is found to exert a signiﬁcant and nega
tive effect on reading achievement, thus providing evi
dence in support of the public exchange view.
In the math achievement equation, education spending
exerts a negative inﬂuence. Signiﬁcant negative effects
are found for the Black and Hispanic percentages of
student bodies, but no effect is found for the Asian per
centage. Median education (positive) and the Herﬁndahl
score (negative) exert signiﬁcant effects. In the writing
achievement equation, education spending exerts a nega
tive and signiﬁcant effect. The federal share of funding
exerts a negative and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on perform

Table 5
SUR estimations of education spending and eighth-grade performance (education spending: per pupil)
Education spending
Constant

3201.43a
4.92

Education spending
Per capita income
Population density
Student share of population
State share of funding
Federal share of funding

0.03
1.55
0.04
0.40
24.75
0.01
127.61
0.22
4712.08
1.40

% Black
% Hispanic
% Asian
Median education
Herﬁndahl
R2 adjusted
S.e.e.
N
a
b
c

626.84a
2.96
0.09
370.54
54

Reading
21.90
0.71
�0.01a
3.64
0.0003
0.87
0.001
0.42
�2.62
0.32
�70.24
1.13
�0.39b
2.03
�0.16a
3.16
0.22
0.99
4.17c
1.72
�12.89a
4.05
0.66
5.33
53

Math
�47.91b
2.10
�0.003c
1.75
�0.0001
0.67
0.001
0.63
�9.54
1.42
�28.11
0.57
�0.38a
2.48
�0.15a
3.59
�0.01
0.03
7.79a
3.98
�10.85a
4.25
0.75
4.22
53

Writing
23.92
0.83
�0.01a
2.79
�1.1×10�5
0.03
0.0004
0.30
�9.25
1.27
�110.24c
1.94
�0.24
1.40
�0.17a
3.67
0.50b
2.45
4.70b
2.13
�6.83b
2.37
0.72
4.71

Teacher–
student ratio
�0.01
0.60
1.23×10�5a
6.71
�2.1×10�7
0.66
�3.7×10�6a
2.97
�0.001
0.11
�0.07
1.57

0.001
0.72
0.005
1.64
0.55
0.005
54

Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test).

ance. Although the Black percentage share of the student
body is unrelated to performance, the Hispanic percent
age (negative) and the Asian percentage (positive) are
signiﬁcantly related to writing achievement. Median edu
cation (positive, as expected) and the Herﬁndahl score
(negative, as predicted by the public exchange view)
exert signiﬁcant inﬂuences on writing achievement. For
the teacher–student ratio equation, education spending
(positive) and population density (negative) exert sig
niﬁcant effects.
Table 6 displays SURs of education spending and
10th-grade performance equations. In the spending equ
ation, the federal share of funding is found to exert a
weak, but signiﬁcant, effect on spending. The Herﬁndahl
score exerts a statistically signiﬁcant and positive effect.
In the reading achievement equation, education spending
exerts a negative and signiﬁcant effect. Population den
sity (positive) and median education (positive) also exert
signiﬁcant inﬂuences. In the math achievement equation,
education spending exerts a negative inﬂuence on
achievement. Signiﬁcant negative effects are found for

the Black and Hispanic percentages of student bodies.
Median education (positive) exerts signiﬁcant effects. In
the writing achievement equation, only the federal share
of funding (negative) and the Black percentage of the
student body (negative) exert signiﬁcant effects. As in
all previous estimations of the teacher–student ratio equ
ation, education spending (positive) and population den
sity (negative) exert signiﬁcant effects.
6.2. Education spending per personal income and
performance equations
Spending per capita is often the barometer that the
public and school ﬁnance authorities use to gage the
adequacy of education resources because it focuses on
resources allocated to “average” students. However, edu
cation spending as a share of the economy reﬂects the
extent to which government controls overall resource
allocation and is often the focus of tests of the Leviathan
hypothesis because it better measures the extent to which

Table 6
SUR estimations of education spending and tenth-grade performance (education spending: per pupil)
Education spending
Constant

3117.78a
4.52

Education spending
Per capita income
Population density
Student share of population
State share of funding
Federal share of funding

0.03
1.55
0.06
0.58
�35.65
0.01
�47.82
0.08
6490.81c
1.91

% Black
% Hispanic
% Asian
Median education
Herﬁndahl
R2 adjusted
S.e.e.
N
a
b
c

580.02b
2.54
0.05
377.59
54

Math

�5.57
0.17
�0.01b
2.50
0.0002
0.58
0.004b
2.33

�41.39b
1.99
�0.004a
2.86
5.7×10�5
0.25
0.001
1.50

�9.99
1.25
35.21
0.53
�0.27
1.37
�0.07
1.42
0.02
0.10
4.81c
1.91
�1.89
0.54
0.54
5.34
53

6.28
1.26
�42.27
1.02
�0.38a
3.03
�0.06c
1.78
0.08
0.57
5.52a
3.52
1.57
0.72
0.64
3.30
53

Writing
�11.64
0.34
0.001
0.30
8.1×10�5
0.22
0.002
1.39

13.21
1.64
�196.02a
2.90
�0.37c
1.84
�0.08
1.51
0.33
1.41
3.87
1.52
3.78
1.07
0.50
5.36
53

Teacher–
student ratio
�0.02
0.59
1.26×10�5a
6.98
�1.9×10�7
0.59
�3.6×10�6a
2.79
�0.002
0.33
�0.06
1.30

0.001
0.63
0.004
1.36
0.55
0.005
54

Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test).

government takes resources away from private owners.16
The previous equations are now run with public edu
cation spending as a percentage of personal income sub
stituted for spending per pupil. For 1993, public edu
cation in California at the primary and secondary levels
averaged 4.22% of personal income, and ranged between
1.19% to 7.02%. Interestingly, the simple correlation
coefﬁcient between education spending per personal
income and education spending per pupil is only 0.17.
Table 7 displays SUR estimations of education spend
ing as a percentage of personal income and fourth-grade
performance equations. In the spending equation, per
capita income (negative), student share of population
(positive), federal share of funding (positive), and the
Herﬁndahl score (positive) exert statistically signiﬁcant
effects. In the reading achievement equation, only
median education (positive) and the Herﬁndahl score
(negative) are signiﬁcantly related to achievement. In the
16

Reading

See Oates (1989) for a survey of this literature.

math achievement equation, education spending
(negative), Black and Hispanic shares of student bodies
(negative), and median education (positive) are found to
exert signiﬁcant inﬂuences. Only median education
(positive) exerts a signiﬁcant effect on writing achieve
ment. Finally, education spending (positive), population
density (negative), and the Herﬁndahl score (positive)
are found to signiﬁcantly affect teacher–student ratios.
Table 8 displays SUR estimations of education spend
ing as a percentage of personal income and eighth-grade
performance equations. In the spending equation, per
capita income (negative), student share of population
(positive), federal share of funding (positive), and the
Herﬁndahl score (positive) exert statistically signiﬁcant
effects. In the reading achievement equation, education
spending (negative), Black and Hispanic shares of stud
ent bodies (negative), Asian share of the student body
(positive), and the Herﬁndahl score (negative) are sig
niﬁcantly related to achievement. In the math achieve
ment equation, Black and Hispanic shares of student
bodies (negative), median education (positive), and the

Table 7
SUR estimations of education spending and fourth-grade performance (education spending: percentage of personal income)
Education spending
Constant

0.71
0.80

Education spending
Per capita income
Population density
Student share of population
State share of funding
Federal share of funding

�0.0001a
4.59
�6.1×10�5
0.47
28.36a
9.13
�0.47
0.60
9.40b
2.05

% Black
% Hispanic
% Asian
Median education
Herﬁndahl
R2 adjusted
S.e.e.
N
a
b
c

0.57b
2.05
0.88
0.51
54

Teacher–
student ratio

Reading

Math

Writing

�69.93a
3.71
0.50
0.89
�0.0001
0.57
0.001
1.29

�47.86b
2.18
�1.46b
2.36
0.0003
1.24
0.001
0.88

�84.26a
3.69
0.69
1.01
�0.0002
1.02
0.001
1.43

�0.02
0.44
0.002c
1.74
�2.2×10�7
0.57
�2.9×10�6c
1.81

8.73
1.58
�34.53
0.86
�0.50a
4.07
�0.11a
3.39
�0.17
1.17
6.11a
3.63
�0.38
0.19
0.82
3.30
53

�7.04
1.16
�28.28
0.71
�0.03
0.19
�0.02
0.65
�0.11
0.76
9.36a
5.22
�2.62
1.31
0.70
3.64
54

�0.003
0.31
�0.02
0.41

�7.33
1.46
�7.37
0.22
�0.07
0.66
�0.01
0.17
�0.04
0.36
7.36a
4.96
�3.34b
2.03
0.71
3.02
54

0.004
1.39
0.01a
3.09
0.28
0.01
54

Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test).

Herﬁndahl score (negative) exert signiﬁcant effects. In
the writing achievement equation, education spending
(negative), federal share of funding (negative), Black and
Hispanic shares of student bodies (negative), Asian share
of the student body (positive), median education
(positive), and the Herﬁndahl score (negative) are sig
niﬁcantly related to achievement. Finally, education
spending (positive), population density (negative), and
the Herﬁndahl score (positive) are found to signiﬁcantly
affect the teacher–student ratios.
Table 9 displays SUR estimations of education spend
ing as a percentage of personal income and tenth-grade
performance equations. In the spending equation, per
capita income (negative), student share of population
(positive), federal share of funding (positive), and the
Herﬁndahl score (positive) exert statistically signiﬁcant
effects. In the reading achievement equation, education
spending (negative), population density (positive), and
the Black share of the student body (negative) are sig
niﬁcantly related to achievement. In the math achieve
ment equation, education spending (negative), state

shares of funding (positive), Black and Hispanic shares
of student bodies (negative), and median education
(positive) are signiﬁcant inﬂuences. In the writing
achievement equation, the federal share of funding
(negative) and median education (positive) are signiﬁ
cantly related to achievement. Only the Herﬁndahl score
(positive) is signiﬁcantly related to teacher–student
ratios.

7. Summary and conclusions
The evidence supports several hypotheses. First,
despite claims to the contrary by many advocates of pub
lic education, higher education spending does not appear
to raise student achievement. When deﬁned as spending
per pupil, education spending exerts a negative inﬂuence
on student achievement in ﬁve out of nine cases and,
when deﬁned as spending as a percentage of personal
income, it exerts a negative effect on student achieve
ment in ﬁve out of nine cases as well. Spending per pupil

Table 8
SUR estimations of education spending and eighth-grade performance (education spending: percentage of personal income)
Education spending
Constant

0.66
0.74

Education spending
Per capita income
Population density
Student share of population
State share of funding
Federal share of funding

�0.0001a
4.71
�4.52×10�5
0.35
29.06a
9.46
�0.56
0.72
9.35b
2.04

% Black
% Hispanic
% Asian
Median education
Herﬁndahl
R2 adjusted
S.e.e.
N
a
b
c

0.57b
1.98
0.87
0.51
54

Reading
40.43
1.22
�3.48a
3.62
�4.0×10�6
0.01
�0.001
0.52

10.10
1.20
�92.20
1.51
�0.62a
3.25
�0.16a
3.16
0.40c
1.85
1.77
0.69
�12.22a
3.88
0.64
5.50
53

Math

Writing

�42.91
1.64
�0.81
1.01
�0.0003
0.97
0.0004
0.32

20.70
0.66
�1.44a
1.61
�0.0002
0.60
�0.0003
0.22

�6.47
0.91
�46.48
1.03
�0.44a
2.85
�0.15a
3.66
0.06
0.37
6.91a
3.32
�11.97a
5.10
0.74
4.32
53

�3.84
0.49
�125.41b
2.17
�0.34c
1.93
�0.17a
3.63
0.57a
2.81
3.90a
2.81
�7.51b
2.53
0.70
4.86
53

Teacher–
student ratio
�0.01
0.39
0.002c
1.81
�2.1×10�7
0.54
�2.7×10�6c
1.69
�0.004
0.39
�0.02
0.40

0.004
1.35
0.01a
3.23
0.29
0.01
54

Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test).

was found to exert a positive inﬂuence in one case and,
in the remaining seven cases, no signiﬁcant inﬂuence
was determined.
Second, education spending tends to be highest in
those counties exhibiting highest monopoly power as
measured by the Herﬁndahl index. This result supports
the predictions of bureaucracy theory since the ability of
public education markets to draw funding is positively
related to their degree of monopoly power. This result
may suggest why higher education spending is not found
to raise academic achievement since the higher spending
may simply ﬂow to administrators, teachers and staff in
ways that bear little connection to student achievement.
While the empirical results show that education spending
is positively related to teacher–student ratios, further
study of where other dollars go, and what effects these
have on student achievement, would be a useful addition
to this study.
While the majority of empirical results indicate either
no link or a perverse link between spending and perform
ance, it is difﬁcult to speculate about how performance

might change if spending were cut across school districts
in California. Perhaps, the inverse relation arises because
high-spending districts tend to be districts with a certain
set of characteristics, including monopoly power, polit
ical intrusions into district policies and procedures, and
poor student performance. However, a literal reading of
the empirical results suggests that spending reductions
across all districts would lead to either no effect on stud
ent performance, or even improvements. Unfortunately,
use of a simple cross-section of data does not allow us
to distinguish between these competing hypotheses,
whereas a panel of cross-sectional data might yield better
understanding of this important policy issue.
Third, median education levels of county residents
exert strong inﬂuences on student achievement in the
majority of cases (15 out of 18 cases). These results are
consistent with the conventional wisdom that family
inﬂuences such as parental education and involvement
play instrumental roles in the development of student
achievement. However, there is little evidence that per
capita income plays much of a role. However, median

Table 9
SUR estimations of education spending and tenth-grade performance (education spending: percentage of personal income)
Education spending
Constant

0.49
0.53

Education spending
Per capita income
Population density
Student share of population
State share of funding
Federal share of funding

�0.0001a
4.51
�2.2×10�5
0.17
28.10a
9.13
�0.53
0.69
11.34b
2.52

% Black
% Hispanic
% Asian
Median education
Herﬁndahl
R2 adjusted
S.e.e.
N
a
b
c

0.71b
2.36
0.88
0.50
54

Reading

Math

�3.47
0.10
�2.09b
2.10
�5.7×10�5
0.16
0.003c
1.70

�30.69
1.42
�2.03a
3.27
�0.0001
0.59
0.001
0.67

�3.85
0.46
21.89
0.33
�0.35c
1.75
�0.06
1.24
0.10
0.44
3.72
1.39
�1.37
0.39
0.55
5.29
53

12.73b
2.47
�49.53
1.20
�0.48a
3.89
�0.06c
1.74
0.17
1.17
4.13b
2.48
2.43
1.11
0.64
3.27
53

Writing
�26.39
0.75
1.18
1.17
0.0001
0.40
0.002
1.61

9.59
1.14
�196.46a
2.93
�0.31
1.51
�0.08
1.54
0.28
1.19
4.90c
1.81
2.76
0.77
0.51
5.36
53

Teacher–
student ratio
�0.01
0.24
0.002
1.54
2.2×10�7
0.56
�2.4×10�6
1.47
�0.001
0.73
0.01
0.15

0.003
1.15
0.01b
2.55
0.23
0.01
54

Signiﬁcance at 0.01 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.05 level (two-tailed test).
Signiﬁcance at 0.10 level (two-tailed test).

education and per capita income data are aggregated to
the county level and therefore do not necessarily track
the inﬂuence that a parent’s education or income exerts
on their own children. A more disaggregated analysis
would clearly be helpful here in sorting out these par
ental inﬂuences. It should also be noted that such factors
go beyond the usual scope of short-term policy reforms,
and at best represent long-term reforms that might
affect achievement.
Fourth, there is strong support (nine out of 12 cases)
for the public exchange view that higher market power
leads to lower student achievement in the fourth and
eighth grades, and little support (one case out of six) for
affecting achievement in the tenth grade. No evidence is
found to support the hypothesis that higher market power
raises performance. While the evidence appears to sug
gest that greatest beneﬁts associated with greater choice
in education providers arise during the formative years of
schooling, this remains a conjecture at this point. Further
research into why competitive structure appears to be

more important in the lower levels would appear to be
warranted.
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